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BAR BRIEFS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECOND MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY
The Summers Act, Chap. IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U. S. C. A., Sec. 301-303, commonly known as the First Municipal
Bankruptcy Law, was held unconstitutional, in that inasmuch as
it applied to political subdivisions of the state, it violated state
sovereignty, and that the state might not voluntarily surrender
its sovereignty to the Federal Government, citing United States
v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935), and also held that the state
might not pass an act impairing the obligation of a contract, U. S.
Const., Art. 1, Sec. X, "nor do we think she can accomplish the
same end by granting any permission necessary to enable
Congress to do so." Ashton v. Cameron County etc., 298 U. S.
513 (1936). In that case the court drew a parallel to the taxing
power.
The need for relief of debt-ridden municipalities, and creditors of such municipalities, however, as appears from the briefs
of counsel set out in United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27 (1938),
was so great that Congress determined to attempt once again to
secure the desired result without encountering the same constitutional objection. Consequently, Chap. X of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 401-404, more popularly known as the
Second Municipal Bankruptcy Act, was enacted but after much
deliberation.
The two Acts are quite similar, at least as regards the powers
of the court, filing of petitions, plans for readjustment, consent of
creditors, and other matters of procedure, as well as the effects
of adjudication. The first Act, Sec. 303, cl. K, provides for consent of the state, or of a state agency. This condition is not
present in the second Act, but it, Sec. 403, cl. E, subd. 6, provides
that a petitioning tax district must be authorized by law to proceed. Both Acts, Sec. 303, cl. K, and Sec. 403, cl. I, provide that
nothing in the Act shall be construed to limit the power of the
state to control its political subdivisions, or to limit the state in
its governmental and political powers. Both Acts, Sec. 303, cl. C,
and Sec. 403 cl. C, provide that the operation of the law shall not
interfere with the political or governmental power of the petitioner; property or revenue necessary to government purposes; and
income producing property unless the plan so provides. Both
Acts are based upon the bankruptcy powers of Congress, Sec. 301
and Sec. 401. The second Act seems to be intended, as far as
constitutional, to extend and include the first. Sec. 403, cl. H,
provides that prior laws as to readjustments of the indebtedness
of political subdivisions are not modified or repealed, but expressly provides that commencement of proceedings under Sec.
303, shall not bar filing of a new petition under Sec. 401. Sec. 403,
cl. J, provides that partial completion of any plan of composition,
before or after filing the petition, shall not be construed as
"limiting or prohibiting the effect of this title," and consenting
creditors under such previous plan are, by the same clause, included as consenting creditors under the plan in connection with
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such petition. The first Act was to be in force until January 1st,
1940, and the second Act is to expire June 30th, 1940, Sec. 301
and Sec. 404.
Said Chap. X was declared to be a constitutional exercise of
the bankruptcy power in United States v. Bekins, et al, 304 U. S
27 (1938). The court there held that the California Legislature
in the Extra Session of 1934 gave consent to the application to
"taxing districts" of the Bankruptcy Act and amendments, including Chap. X, added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1937. The
court said further that the omission from Chap. X of any provision requiring consent of the state was immaterial where the
state actually had consented, and pointed out that where Chap.
X says that the petitioner must be "authorized by law," the
language refers to state law.
The opinion in the case of United States v. Bekins, supra,
stated, among other things: "The ability to contract and to give
consents upon the exertion of governmental power is of the
essence of sovereignty. The reservation to the states by the 10th
Amendment did not destroy, but protected, their right to make
contracts and give consents where that action would not contravene the provisions of the Federal Constitution. Cooperation between Nation and State through the exercise of the powers of
each, to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both, is
consistent with an indestructible Union of Indestructible States."
The opinion in the Bekins case also mentioned Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). That case stated, in part:
".... even Sovereigns may contract without derogating from their
sovereignty.. . The states are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of Congress, to make agreements with one another ... We
find no room for doubt that they may do the like with
Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without
impairment." Generally, we think of sovereignty as the power or
authority of the state, if not to do every act, at least to do
all things necessary to the good government and well being of its
citizens.
Query, is it logical to hold, as did the Ashton case, that the Act
of Congress, the First Municipal Bankruptcy Law was a usurpation of state sovereignty, and the consent of the state, an unconstitutional surrender of sovereignty; or, is it better logic to hold
with the Bekins case, that, in order to accomplish a much desired
and decidedly beneficial end, that the Act of Congress, the Second
Municipal Bankruptcy Act, and the consent of the state, were not
inconsistent with the sovereignty of the state, but were constitutional exercises of sovereign powers, "cooperation between
Nation and State," "to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both?"
CYRUS N. LYCHE,
Law Student,
University of North Dakota.

